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It was not until Chancellor Harrington in the recent
case of Delaware Trust Company v. Graham7 reinvestigated the origins of the cy pres doctrine and came to the
conclusion that "in principle there, therefore seems to be
no good reason why judicial cy pres should not be applied
in appropriate cases by this court" that the misconception
of the earlier court was finally exposed and effectively
demolished. Delaware Trust Company v. Graham involved
a testamentary bequest to a trust company in trust, the
income to be paid to a foreign missionary society of a
designated Methodist church for the purpose of furthering
the objects and purposes of that society. The Foreign
Missionary Society, an unincorporated society, was in existence at the time of the death of the testator in 1926 and
received the net income from the fund until 1940 when it
ceased to exist as a result of the merger of various church
organizations. The chancellor recognized that the cy pres
rule as used in England was applicable to charitable uses
in both judicial and ministerial cases and adopted the doctrine by awarding the income of the fund to a similar
church society to be used for the purposes designated by
the testator.
With this judicial clarification of the law it is hoped
that the Delaware courts will continue to construe the
doctrine liberally so that in the future there will be no
"wrecks of original charities,-charities that were dear to
the hearts of their would-be founders, and the execution
of which would have been of inestimable value to the
public.""8
NOTICE OF TERMINATION REQUIRED TO
TERMINATE A PERIODIC TENANCY
IMPLIED UNDER A VOID LEASE
Darling Shops Delaware Corporation v. Baltimore
Center Corporation'
The plaintiff, the Baltimore Center Corporation, after
giving less than a three-month notice to quit, brought a
summary proceeding to recover possession of the premises
occupied by the defendant under two void or unenforceable leases. The predecessor in title of the plaintiff, the
Supra, n. 1. 113.
S

11Allen

v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 140, 55 N. E. 568, 572 (1899).

I60 A. (2d) 669 (Md. 1948).
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Cumberland Realty Company, executed on November 16,
1937, a written instrument purporting to lease for a period
of ten years to the defendant, Darling Shops, a stock room
in the premises it then owned in Cumberland, Maryland.
The term stipulated for was from February 1, 1938 to January 31, 1948 at an annual rent of $8,500 payable in equal
monthly installments. By a subsequent writing, dated May
9, 1940, the Cumberland Realty Company, plaintiff's predecessor, leased additional space in the same premises for
seven years and nine months, the term commencing May 1,
1940 and expiring January 31, 1948 at the same date as
specified in the prior lease. Under this supplemental agreement, an annual rent of $1,500 was payable monthly in
equal installments. Neither of these leases was executed,
acknowledged, and recorded in compliance with the Maryland statutory provisionsla, and neither was effectual, therefore, to pass any estate to the defendant. At the beginning of each of the two terms, the defendant entered
into possession of the premises and thereafter paid the
monthly installments of rent in conformity with the provisions of both leases. In May, 1944, the plaintiff acquired
title to the premises occupied by the defendant through a
conveyance from the Cumberland Realty Company. On
November 14, 1947, less than three months before the
expiration of the stipulated terms, the plaintiff notified the
defendant that it expected the tenant to surrender possession and vacate the premises on January 31, 1948, in
accordance with the provisions of the leases. Subsequently,
the defendant failed to quit, and its tender of the rents after
January 31, 1948 was refused by the landlord. On February
2, 1948, the plaintiff instituted a summary proceeding before the trial magistrate to recover possession of the premises under the provisions of Article 53 of the Code. The
magistrate rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant,
and, on appeal by the plaintiff to the Circuit Court for
Allegany County, this judgment was reversed, and a judgment of restitution was entered for the plaintiff. On petition by the defendant, with the assent of the plaintiff, the
Court of Appeals granted certiorari,and subsequently reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court.
Md. 'Code (1939) Art. 21, Sec. 1, cf. Schultz v. Kaplan, 56 A. (2d) 16
(Md. 1947), noted (1948) 9 Md. L. Rev. 190; cases cited therein; Hyatt v.
Romera, 58 A. (2d) 899 (Md. 1948); Saul v. McIntyre, 57 A. (2d) 272
(Md. 1948); Saul v. McIntyre (second appeal); Baltimore Daily Record,
March 2, 1949 (Md. 1949), for treatment of the status of renewable term
leases for terms of seven years or less.
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The case presented two questions, the first of which
was a determination of the nature of the defendant's tenancy. The Court, speaking through Chief Judge Marbury,
held that the defendant was a tenant from year to year.
From an examination of Article 21, Section 1, it is at
once manifest that the leases, executed by the Cumberland
Realty Company to the defendant, were inoperative to
convey an estate for years, for the statute declares that:
"No estate ...above seven years, shall pass or take effect
unless the deed conveying the same shall be executed,
acknowledged and recorded as herein provided. . ." Since
the leases did not comply with the statute, the Court, in
order to ascertain the nature of the tenancy under which
the defendant held, reviewed the background and development of the concept of an implied in fact periodic tenancy.
Originally, at common law, a tenant who entered into
possession under a void or unenforceable lease became at
once a mere tenant at will, whose holding either the landlord or tenant could terminate at any time without notice.
The courts soon realized that such an indefinite and uncertain arrangement worked a hardship on both parties,
and they took advantage of any circumstance which seemed
to evince an intention that reasonable notice of termination
would be required. In time, a six-month notice was held
to be necessary. To find the nature of the tenancy thus
created, the courts used the period for which the rent was
measurable, under the terms of the unenforceable or void
lease, as a criterion in determining the particular kind
of holding which resulted from the tenant's entry into
possession and subsequent periodical payments of rent.
Where the tenant was placed in possession and thereafter
paid periodic rent, an implied in fact periodic tenancy
arose.2 If the rent reserved to the landlord by the terms
of the unenforceable lease was calculated or measurable
on an annual basis, then, as in this case, the tenancy was
from year to year, notwithstanding the fact that such rent
was payable by the month.
The Court, in its opinion, compared this implied in fact
periodic tenancy with the tenancy which is created when
a lessee in possession under a valid lease holds over after
the expiration of his specified term and continues to pay
the stipulated rent which the landlord accepts. While it
is true, as the Court pointed out, that in each instance the
tenant impliedly holds subject to the terms of the lease,
'Cook v. Boebl, 53 A. (2d) 555 (Md. 1947); Hyatt v. Romero, 58 A. (2d)
899 (Md. 1948).
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excepting the provision as to the duration of the term,
the factors which give rise to each of these types of tenancies are different and distinguishable. By entering into
possession under a void or unenforceable lease, the tenant
becomes a tenant at will immediately, and, upon his payment of rent as provided in such lease, he becomes an
implied in fact periodic tenant from year to year, quarter
to quarter, month to month, or week to week, depending
upon the period for which the rent was measurable in that
lease. But a tenant who holds over after the expiration
of the term designated in the valid lease becomes a mere
tenant at sufferance.3 The landlord may treat such tenant
as a trespasser, or he may elect to hold him as a periodic
tenant from year to year if the expired lease was for a term
of a year or more, irrespective of the period for which the
rent was measurable.' The duration of the term in the
lease which expired, not the rent period, determines the
period of an implied in law periodic tenancy.5
The second and vital question presented by the case
was whether an implied in fact periodic tenancy automatically terminates without notice at the expiration of the
term stipulated in the void or unenforceable lease. After
a review and analysis of the authorities, the Court held
that notice was necessary to terminate such a tenancy.
According to the English view, a tenancy from year to
year which is created by an entry into possession under
an invalid lease is terminable by notice during the term
specified in such lease, but without notice to quit at the
expiration of that term.6 This doctrine has been cited with
approval in at least one jurisdiction in this country.7 The
rationale of this rule was enunciated, as the Court mentioned in the opinion, in an 1828 English decision in which
it was said that an unnecessary multiplicity of notices to
quit would result from a contrary holding.8 The Court
refused to adopt this view on the ground that it was not
founded upon sound logic. Furthermore, the English rule
could not prevail in the face of the clear requirement of
832 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, See. 75 (1941) ; Tiffany, Landlord
and Tenant (1910) Sec. 208.
'Hall v. Myers, 43 Md. 446 (1875) ; Gressitt v. Anderson, 51 A. (2d)
159 (Md. 1947) ; Fetting Mfg. Jewelry Co. v. Waltz, 160 Md. 50, 152 A.
434, 71 A. L. . 1443 (1930).
1 See 108 A. L. R. 1466 (1937) ; 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Sec.
942 (1941).
*Martin v. Smith, L. R. 9 Ex. 50 (1874).
1 Coudert v. Cohn, 118 N. Y. 309, 23 N. E. 298, 7 L. R. A. 69, 16 A. S. R.
761 (1890).
'Doe dem Tilt v. Stratton, 4 Bing. 446, 130 Eng. Rep. 839 (1828).
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the local statute which provides that: ". . . in case of
tenancies [except farm tenancies] from year to year in the
counties, a notice in writing shall be given three months
before the expiration of the current year of the tenancy
. ."
Compliance with this provision by the landlord
is thus made an express condition precedent to his bringing
of the summary proceeding to recover possession.
If the Court had followed the rule laid down in the
English cases and held that this implied in fact periodic
tenancy terminated automatically without notice at the
end of the term stipulated in each of the void or unenforceable leases, then it would have decided that the defendant
was a tenant from year to year, except that, during the
last year of the specified terms, it was a tenant for a year.
Such a ruling would be tantamount, in the language of
Chief Judge Marbury, to holding that, "while the lease is
void and unenforceable, and the tenant by operation of
law holds from year to year, nevertheless, the lease is
valid during the last year to create a tenancy for years.
This no case has decided." The conclusion reached by
the Court follows inevitably from the fact that while a
yoid or unenforceable lease is evidence of the incidents
which affect the holding, it does not control the nature of
the tenancy. Under the English doctrine, the termination
of the holding at the end of the specified term is necessarily
one of the incidents which attaches to the implied in fact
tenancy from year to year, and the tenant, therefore, has
notice from the lease.
The decision of the Court recognizes that, if either party
had sought and obtained the enforcement of these leases
against the other party as agreements to lease, "then the
tenancies would have been for a term of years, terminating
at the expiration of such terms, without notice". Since
the leases were not so enforced, an implied in fact periodic
tenancy from year to year was created and was terminable
only by giving the three-month notice required by the
statute.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Markell stated that
there was no reason for departing from the rule of the
English cases in regard to the matter of notice of termination, and that, by so doing, injustice resulted to the
*

I

Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 53, Sec. 7.
Ibid. See also Rowland v. Cook, 179 Wash. 624, 38 P. (2d) 224, 101
A. L. R. 180 (1934), which stated that, if a lessee enters into possession and
pays rent under an unenforceable lease, the periodic tenancy which Is
thereby created is terminable on statutory notice.
9
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plaintiff. Hence, he felt that these leases were not void
but only unenforceable and that, since they were performed
by the parties themselves, the tenancy should not be considered as a holding from year to year. Having voluntarily
performed its contract, the lessor ought not to be placed in
a worse position than if the lease had been specifically
enforced.
IMPLICATION OF SURVIVORSHIP IN CONTINGENT
GIFTS TO A CLASS
Reese v. Reese 1
Evans v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.2
The above recent Maryland cases present an interesting
problem of construction in connection with gifts to a class
as distinguished from gifts to individuals. An examination
of the Court's construction in each case, as concerned
with class gifts and an implied condition precedent of survivorship, raises the question why such an implied condition is held to be a hard and fast rule when there is a
contingent gift to a class and not when the gift is to an
individual.
In the Reese case, the will, executed October 19, 1889,
devised to the testator's unmarried son, John B. Reese, a
life estate in his farm (with certain conditions not here
important). The will then contained the following provision: "In case of the death of Mary L. Reese [testator's
daughter], John B. Reese, and the wife of John B. Reese,
then the whole of said property to go to the children of
John B. Reese and wife, if any, and if no children, then
the said property to revert to my grandchildren, the issue
of both of my sons, Charles A. Reese and Francis D. Reese,
as tenants in common, the issue of said sons to take same
per capita."
Under the provision, creating an alternative contingent
remainder in the grandchildren of the testator, there were
two possible constructions before the Court. First, it could
be construed as a gift to a class, i.e., a contingent gift to a
class consisting of the grandchildren of the testator, dependent upon John dying without children surviving. As
the Court pointed out in its opinion "the cardinal rule for
testamentary construction is that the intention of the testa1

58A. (2d) 643 (Md. 1948).
'58A. (2d) 649 (Md. 1948).

